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Canada’s oil industry is thriving thanks to the recent and continuously increasing 
interest for the Albertan oil sands. While for some the oil sands are a success story others 
consider them one of Canada’s greatest social and environmental threats. Recently, a 
major controversy has evolved around the Kearl Oil Sands project (2003-2008) regarding 
what level of environmental uncertainties was acceptable or not and how to deal with 
them. In this thesis, the negotiation processes between the different social groups 
involved in this controversy will be analysed through a social constructivist perspective. 
Since the debate revolves around uncertainties, the groups’ discourses and approaches to 
uncertainties will be contrasted. In the end, this study shows that there are two main 
positions about uncertainties. While the environmentalist groups regard them as 
unspecified and stable and undertake a precautionary approach to developments, the oil 
industry and the government consider them as specified and temporary, thus advocating 
more expertise and adaptive management. This analysis provides an insight on the social 
construction of environmental problems and how they are legally dealt with. 
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In the province of Alberta, Canada, lie the second largest known oil reserves in 
the world after Saudi Arabia: the Albertan oil sands. In the last decade, with the 
international geo-political tensions, decreasing crude oil reserves, and rising oil prices it 
has become profitable to invest in the oil sands. In 1995 the report The Oil Sands: A New 
Energy Vision for Canada laid out an exploitation strategy over the next 25 years and in 
1997, the Albertan provincial and the Canadian federal governments implemented tax 
breaks to facilitate the development of oil sands mines. This resulted in intensive 
industrial development in the oil sands leading to more than $52 billion injected in 81 oil 
sands projects since 2000.  
Needless to say, such an intensive industry affects surrounding ecosystems and 
does not go not without environmental problems. Among other things the mining 
processes involve heavy landscape modifications, important water intakes, the creation of 
toxic tailings ponds and a significant contribution to greenhouse gases emissions. Instead 
of assuming that environmental problems reveal themselves through their objective 
conditions, I will endorse a constructivist perspective that views environmental problems 
as contingent outcomes of negotiation processes. A central stage for those negotiation 
processes in the oil sands case is the regulatory approval process of new mining projects. 
The Canadian government instated a strong environmental assessment process, which 
involves all social groups affected and interested and evaluates the level of uncertainties 
implied by a project before approval is granted. I will study this assessment process in the 
particular case of the Kearl Oil Sands (KOS) project whose environmental assessment 
ended up in front of a court, accused of being unlawful. The KOS project was undertaken 
by Imperial Oil and underwent the usual environmental assessment process between 2003 
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and 2007. It was then granted approval by the government after an independent panel 
reviewed it. The controversy arose when environmentalists groups opposed the 
independent panel’s recommendations by requiring a judicial review of their report on the 
grounds that they had not provided a sufficient rationale for allowing the project to 
proceed although it implied significant environmental uncertainties. After the review, 
which took place in January 2008, the Judge ruled partly against the panel on March 5, 
2008 and the panel corrected its report on May 6, 2008.   
In the very recent KOS controversy I will look at the negotiations between the 
industry, government and environmentalist groups involved with a specific focus on how 
environmental uncertainties are dealt with. This will allow me to study the construction 
of environmental problems in a symmetrical and dynamic way (cf. Martin and Richards, 
1995).  
In the light of this controversy, my key questions are: How do the different parties 
involved deal with uncertainties? Do they use comparable approaches and are their 
approaches internally consistent with themselves? Moreover, why and how does the legal 
negotiation process participate in the social construction of an environmental risk (cf. 
Hannigan, 2006)? I postulate the following hypothesis: in the social construction of 
environmental problems around the KOS controversy, the ways uncertainties were 
addressed differed between the parties involved. Moreover, each group used the notion of 
uncertainties in an ambiguous way in order to fulfil its own interests. 
Before starting my empirical analysis, I will review what has been said in the 
Science and Technology Studies literature regarding uncertainties and thereby develop the 
notions that will be useful in analysing the KOS case. Then, I will describe the methods I 
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have used to answer my questions, i.e. principally discourse analysis. This will be 
followed by the analysis of the KOS story in depth and in context, by introducing a brief 
overview of the Albertan oil sands system including the technology used, the history of 
the scientific environmental risk claims and the regulatory process for oil sands projects. 
Subsequently, I will start from the beginning of the KOS environmental assessment 
process until the resolution of its legal case. Linking the concepts and the case study, I 
aim at using a constructivist perspective on environmental controversies, bringing in a 
modest contribution to the field of social construction of environmental problems. 
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2. Theoretical Concepts and Debates related to the KOS case 
This chapter will draw attention to the theoretical debates that are involved in the 
KOS controversy. To begin with, I will briefly introduce the notion of controversy in 
order to be able to characterize the KOS case as a specific type of controversy later on. 
Then, since the KOS case began with an environmental assessment, it is important to 
address the theoretical ideas underlying this process. The aim of environmental 
assessments is to determine whether a project is not against the public interest, i.e. 
whether it comprises dangerous risks or high uncertainties with severe consequences. 
Therefore the second part of this chapter will deal with the notions of risk and 
uncertainties with a focus on uncertainties since they were the point of legal debate in the 
KOS case. Thirdly, different actors have different views and approaches to uncertainties, 
which were also confronted to each other in the legal dispute. To study these different 
views, dimensions of uncertainties will be explained to elucidate each group’s views. 
Finally, the Judge recognizes different ways of dealing with uncertainties like expertise, 
the precautionary principle/approach and adaptive management, whose salient features 
will be highlighted in the fourth and last part. 
 
2.1 Environmental Controversies 
Controversies are conflicts that involve opposing statements on an issue. Dietz 
and co-authors (1989) conducted an empirical study on the social construction of 
conflicts in the environmental arena and used four possible causes of conflicts for their 
research. What is interesting is their classification of the origins of conflict, which are: 
differential knowledge, vested interests, value differences and mistrust of expert 
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knowledge. Firstly, differential knowledge represents opposing scientific statements on 
an issue. It is possible to have differential knowledge as the origin of a conflict when a 
topic is so complex that it begs scientists to differ. Secondly, vested interests describe a 
conflict where the risks and benefits are not evenly distributed across groups, therefore 
triggering conflict. Thirdly, value differences are seen in a decision-making process 
where high uncertainties are involved and different groups emphasize different values be 
it economic or environmental. Finally, mistrust of expert knowledge can also be a cause 
of environmental controversies through values and interest, which are attributed from the 
group to which experts belong.  
The commonalities between these various potential causes for environmental 
controversies are the complexity of the situation, the difficulty to have a clear objective 
assessment of risks and the high uncertainties. Values and interests become tantamount to 
knowledge. The following parts will describe how objective risk assessments have 
become more and more difficult and thereby show the emergence of uncertainties. 
 
2.2 The Emergence of Uncertainties 
Since the 1970s-80s, public and sociological awareness for the phenomena of risk, 
uncertainty and ignorance increased significantly. This development was the result of 
increasing political conflicts about technological development and environmental issues 
and their theoretical reflection in many fields of the social sciences. Threats of pollution, 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, energy crises and a global awareness of Earth’s limited 
resources can be seen as the main preoccupation in the 60s-70s. Also, major events like 
the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Bhopal disaster in 1984 and the Chernobyl 
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catastrophe in 1986 contributed to expansion of environmental movements on the global 
scene (Jasanoff, 2001, p.310; for a brief historical overview of environmentalist 
movements see Jamison, 1996, p.225-226). At the same time, constructivist approaches 
to risk, uncertainties and ignorance emerged, often replacing functionalist approaches that 
had widely dominated the academic discussion of the 1940s, 50s and 60s (cf. Wehling, 
2006, p.83; Hannigan, 2006, p.63, 108ff). 
The new debates of the 1970s and 80s first started under the heading of ‘risk’ drawing 
on existing terminologies in economics, psychology or technology studies (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Slovic, 1979 [in Tierney, 1999, p.218]; Beck, 1992; cf. Wehling, 2006, 
p.85). It soon became clear, however, that the classical risk term could not quite capture 
what seemed to be particularly interesting about the new social and political conflicts 
concerning technological development and environmental issues. In the field of risk 
assessment or decision-making theory the term risk had usually been referred to as the 
objective probability of an event to occur (Hannigan, 2006, p.109). Objectivizing risks 
only works, however, when risky events can be compared and probabilities calculated 
(cf. Ewald, 1991). 
The new conflicts about technology and the environment have stimulated 
criticism of the classical objective approach. Particularly, two points have been 
addressed: first the shortcomings of its notion of objectivity and second the nature of the 
‘new risks’. While the discussion of the first point remained under the headline of risk, 
the discussion of the second point shifted away from risk and brought in notions of 
uncertainties and ignorance.  
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From an anthropological standpoint, Douglas and Wildasvsky (1982) argued that 
risks are not only objective statistics but are also strongly embedded in culture. The 
authors endorse a relativist perspective through which scientific evidence or the 
likelihood of danger has little to do with actual risks. Rather, risks can be considered as 
‘collective constructs’ subject to cultural and group values (Douglas and Wildasvsky, 
1982) negotiated through competing claims about risks. Although Douglas and 
Wildasvsky have been criticized for their cultural relativism (Hannigan, 2006, p.110f), 
their book played an important role in challenging the objectivity of the notion of risk.  
Also, research in psychology and social psychology about the perception of risk 
revealed that most people have problems understanding risk information and looked for 
explanations with regards to discrepancies between calculated and perceived risks (Slovic 
et al. 1979; McDaniels et al. 1995; Slovic 1992; Tverski and Kahneman., 1973 [in 
Tierney, 1999]). Moreover, it became clear that perceived risks could undergo 
amplification through several social processes also questioning its independence from 
social factors (Kasperson, 1992). 
For other authors, there exists reconciliation between a so-called objective 
approach, also referred to as technical risk assessment (Renn, 1992) and more relative 
approaches that take culture and perception into account. For instance, in his 
classification of risk, Renn acknowledges that risks are not only objectively defined. For 
him, technical risk assessments are necessary but narrow. However, this narrowness can 
be completed with risk analyses from the social sciences (Renn, 1992, p. 60f). The 
concept of risk can therefore be considered as having multiple dimensions and its 
definition cannot therefore be as straightforward as an objective measure. 
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In the academic discussions about the new technological and environmental 
problems, it soon became clear that the term ‘risk’ did not capture the issue. Beck’s Risk 
Society, first published in German in 1986 opened the debate about the new risks. The 
increasing complexity of systems brought about by modernity creates a risk society 
where risks are unintentional, unseen and compulsive and are the result of technological 
latent side effects. 
From then on, the considerations about the nature of risks took off. It became 
apparent to many scholars that using the term risk led to the tendency of overlooking 
essential differences concerning the knowledge about possible side effects and the ability 
to control them (Wynne, 1992). Many authors have argued that the nature of the new 
problems was different (cf. Weinberg, 1985; cf. Collingridge, 1980; cf. Wehling, 2006, 
cf. Beck, 1992; cf. Krohn and Krücken, 1993). For example, the perils of nuclear 
technologies and gene engineering did not fit the classical criteria for objective risk 
assessment. In cases like these it is hardly possible to assess probabilities and the amount 
of damage. Moreover, the scope of the side effects is barely knowable. The new risks are 
no longer comparable (cf. Weinberg, 1985) calculable and predictable. Also, in the 
classical sense, the risks would be on those who take them, whereas in the new sense, a 
large part of risks are on those who did not participate but are subject to the consequences 
(cf. Krohn and Krücken, 1993). Today, new risks often threaten a larger number of 
people in an unpredictable way (Beck, 1992; Perrow, 1984).  
As it became clear that the terms risk or even new risk did not quite capture what 
seemed to be the interesting aspect, in the literature, there is a shift from what we know 
and control to what we do not know and therefore do not control. This insight has shifted 
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the discussion away from the notion of risk to the notions of uncertainties and ignorance. 
These notions existed before and did not emerge as a result of the limits of the risk 
concept. Smithson writes: “Traditionally, ignorance is treated as either the absence or the 
distortion of “true” knowledge, and uncertainty as some form of incompleteness in 
information or knowledge” (1993, p. 136). However, to this day, these notions are still 
debated and there are still confusions and controversies on terminologies with 
differentiations between uncertainty and ignorance, which basically represent a full or 
partial lack of knowledge (Collingridge, 1980; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982 [In 
Wehling, 2006, p.110]; Ravetz, 1986; Wynne, 1992; Wehling, 2006). What is also 
interesting in the debates about non-knowledge and its fine differentiations is that 
sociologists worked on it especially through the notion of ignorance. Wehling (2006) for 
instance, criticizes the continuum between risk, uncertainties and ignorance and focuses 
his work on ignorance. He supports that ignorance has a completely different quality than 
risk or uncertainties and he suggests studying it through different dimensions. On the 
other hand, authors like Stirling (2007) provide a typology of risk, uncertainties, 
ambiguity and ignorance classifying them according the notions of known probabilities 
and known outcomes. Aside from classifying or putting in dimensions uncertainties and 
ignorance, Smithson (1989) argues that the rules that applied to the social construction of 
knowledge also apply to the social construction of ignorance. Further, Stocking and 
Holstein (1993) describe ignorance construction as a claims making activity. According 
to the authors, perspectives on ignorance vary depending on the situatedness of the 
claims-makers and their interests. As there is competition between claims, different 
groups will use rhetorical strategies to put their perspective forward.  
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All in all, the terms uncertainty and ignorance are used to describe the realm of 
what we do not know. Although scholars tend to focus on the term ignorance, politicians, 
entrepreneurs and the public seem to refer to it mostly as uncertainties. Therefore, 
although most of the cited work has been done on ignorance, I will refer to it as 
uncertainties, embedding scholarly notions of uncertainties and ignorance. 
 
2.3 Dimensions of Uncertainty 
A useful way to look at uncertainties and how different actors talk about them is to 
look at a series of criteria occurring in each actor’s discourse about uncertainties. To do 
so, Wehling’s existing dimension of ignorance (Wehling, 2006, p.116ff) can be applied, 
in the context of this work, to uncertainties. Although he developed them to study 
ignorance in a three-dimensional fashion looking at knowledge, intentions and temporal 
stability, I will use these to look at the different discourses about uncertainties. Figure 2.1 
below offers a representation of the dimensions and their different degrees. It is important 
to note, that all three dimensions represent continuums. They therefore create a three 
dimensional space of possible intermediate forms. 
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Figure 2.1: Wehling’s dimensions of ignorance 
 
On the x-axis, we have the dimension of knowledge, within which different degrees 
go from unknown to specified. Wehling talks about known ignorance in the sense that, 
like knowledge, ignorance is not permanently present but it can become explicit in a 
relevant context where a problem needing that particular information occurs. For my 
analytical model, unknown uncertainties are the ones we do not know that we do not 
know and specified uncertainties are the ones we are aware we do not know, both in a 
specific context. 
The y-axis represents the dimension of intentionality, which ranges from unintended 
to intended uncertainties. Wehling describes unintended ignorance as the inevitable by-
product of the production of knowledge. Intended ignorance has an intention and interest-
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laden quality. It can either mean that the actors do not want to know something or they 
want to hinder others from knowing something. In my analytical framework, there are in 
the same way unintended uncertainties, which result from the complexity of the system, 
and intended uncertainties, which are intentionally presented as uncertainty for the actor’s 
interests. 
The z-axis represents the dimension of temporal stability of uncertainties, which 
ranges from temporary to stable. What Wehling means by that in the context of 
ignorance is that a temporary ignorance is an ignorance that one will eventually transform 
into knowledge and a stable ignorance is one that will never be found out. However, 
Wehling (2006, p.133) points out here that these distinctions are always apt to social 
interpretation or conditions, i.e. through the interests in an issue and the state of scientific 
knowledge at the time. Ignorance is usually considered temporary, but for certain issues 
like climate change or genetically modified organisms, the temporary notion is difficult 
to apply regarding the extent of what temporary can mean. In the present case, these 
dimensions will also apply to uncertainty. 
 
2.4 Ways to deal with Uncertainties and their Limits  
As previously mentioned, dealing with risk had a predictable and comparable 
dimension and it has always been a challenge. However, with the overwhelming 
uncertainties of the current high-technology society, dealing with uncertainties has 
become an even bigger challenge. Different authors point out different ways of dealing 
with uncertainties in eco-socio-technological systems. Collingridge (1980) first opened 
the debate in 1980 with the so-called control dilemma in which he points out that 
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deliberate shaping of technologies can only take place at early stages of technological 
development but the consequences are only known at a later stage. Since then different 
proposals have been made as to how one could deal with uncertainties. Three of them that 
are widely discussed are presented here: scientific expertise, the precautionary principle 
and adaptive management. 
 
2.4.1 Expertise 
Although social constructivism of knowledge has debunked scientists’ ivory 
tower, they still remain in society the most legitimate source for answers. Wehling (2006, 
p.279ff) presents the work of van der Daele and his expertise-model. It supports the 
following idea: if experts discuss sufficiently within their own community, without lay 
knowledge, they will be able to specify ignorance. In dealing with uncertainties, the 
notion that they are temporal as discussed earlier joins this expertise-model since it 
considers that answers will be provided in time even if at the moment it is unknown. 
Wehling criticises this model for only looking at the known or suggested ignorance of 
experts: (1) it does not deal with the problem of unknown ignorance – this also applies to 
uncertainties (as the actors do not use the word ignorance) and the expectation is that 
experts find solutions to specific problems, which do not have any yet; (2) it does not 
take into account problems that were not defined at the beginning of the project; (3) it 
considers experts as the ultimate source of legitimacy – the relevance of ignorance or 
uncertainties cannot only be assessed by empirical claims; it is genuinely connected to 
values.  
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An aperture that has been made in recent times is to consider other forms of 
knowledge as scientific knowledge. Lay-knowledge helps understanding the bigger 
picture and the stakes that are involved. It also challenges the idea of objective and 
absolute scientific knowledge and lets the idea of values come in as different social 
groups are taken into account. In this work, expertise is a concept used by all groups, 
which will be demonstrated in chapter 4. 
 
2.4.2 The Precautionary Principle 
Another way of dealing with uncertainties is the precautionary principle (PP), 
which gives place to values. However, despite its broad use in the political sphere, there 
remains an extreme variability in interpretation (Foster et al., 2000). In its most extreme 
form the precautionary principle prohibits any implementation of new technologies 
unless there is an absolute proof of safety, and has therefore been criticized for its 
paralyzing effects (Foster et al., 2000; Sunstein, 2003). A less radical reading of the 
principle only demands that a lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing measures to counteract possible harmful effects (cf. Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992 [In: Foster, 2000]).  
Although the definitions are multiple, each of them still leaves room for 
interpretation. In the European context, with similar definitions and guidelines (cf. Foster, 
2001; cf. European Community Communication on PP, 2000), Renn describes the PP as 
still possessing “serious ambiguities and queries” (2007, p.303). 
To begin with, the PP is not a novel idea. Kriebel and co-authors (2001) describe 
its presence under different appellations in different countries, originating in Germany as 
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the Vorsorgeprinzip related to environmental policy. With growing concerns regarding 
climate change and other global environmental issues, the term PP has become 
predominant (Adams, 2002). Moreover, Adams describes a transition between the 
precautionary approach and the precautionary principle depending on environmental and 
national contexts. Many authors argue that the precautionary principle is ill defined and 
perhaps even not definable (Renn, 2007; Adams, 2002; O’Riordan, 2001). 
Scholars point out the contradiction of the term in itself (Adams, 2002; Balzano and 
Shepard, 2002) as a principle, thus a general truth, and a precaution, which implies a 
judgement that cannot be defined by a universally accepted law. Also, PP presents 
contradictions with other fundamental rules of logic and authors accuse the PP of being 
“normatively empty” (Peterson, 2007, p.307). The place of science in the use of the PP 
has also been studied (Resnik, 2003; Foster et al., 2000). Since the PP is not a rule, and 
relies importantly on value-judgement, authors have suggested sound ways of using it 
since it is becoming widely used as a tool in environmental policy-making to deal with 
uncertainties (Resnik, 2003; Stirling, 2007; Sandin et al, 2002).  
Nonetheless, van Asselt and Vos (2006) point out another underlying paradox to 
the precautionary principle in its application, which is “on the one hand, it is increasingly 
recognized that science cannot provide decisive evidence on uncertain risks, while on the 
other hand policy-makers and authorities increasingly resort to science for more certainty 
and conclusive evidence (compare Weingart, 1999)” (2006, p.317).  
The increasing debates on the PP in Europe have spilled over to North America; it 
has been integrated to the Canadian legislation with the same definition as found in the 
Rio Convention. Environment Canada has also published a pamphlet on its website 
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regarding the precautionary principle. In this document dated from 2002, it stated that the 
precautionary approach “creates a positive legal duty to act” but that it is also a “decision 
to act or not to act” (Environment Canada Guidelines on the PP). In this document, the 
terms precautionary approach and precautionary principle are used interchangeably, 
although a note remarks that they can be understood differently without further 
comments. In the following chapters, the actors also seem to use these terms without 
stating their difference. While the precautionary principle has a lot to do with value 
judgement, this Canadian document stresses the need of sound scientific information and 
of scientific “follow-up” programs on precautionary decisions. 
 
2.4.3 Adaptive Management 
The use of follow-up programs in a precautionary approach reminds of adaptive 
management, which is another tool that some groups seem to favor in dealing with 
uncertainties. Adaptive management is a concept developed by Canadian ecologists C.S. 
Holling and C. J. Walters (Holling, 1978; Walters 1986; Holling and Walters, 1990) and 
it has been strongly embedded in North American customs of fishery management. 
Adaptive management consists in handling the uncertainties step-by-step, as the 
problems show up. This corresponds to Collingridge’s initial idea of a control dilemma 
where the quandary lies in the decision under uncertainty and the path-dependency of a 
project. He supported that to avoid irreversible consequences one has to detect the 
negative effects as soon as possible and be able to adjust initial decisions. That is also the 
idea behind adaptive management: decisions under uncertainties are not fixed. They are 
subject to change as soon as negative signs appear. This converges also towards the idea 
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of real-world experiments developed by Krohn and colleagues (Gross et al, 2005), where 
the process of learning is central to dealing with uncertainties. It is also said to be useful 
in overcoming the paralyzing effects of the precautionary principle. 
Although the idea is so simple and enticing, it still presents some problems. 
Adaptive management (AM) has been criticized for overestimating the ability of the 
proponent to regulate and underestimating the temporal stability of the uncertainties (cf. 
Wehling, 2006). Beck (1996) describes these side effects as latent and unseen. Can they 
be monitored at all? And can they be specified in time? McLain and Lee (1996) also 
point out other pitfalls of AM which all result through the use of standardized models 
shared by scientists, regulators and policy-makers. This lack of diversity may lead to 
dismissing hypothesis that could be valid if studied under a different angle. 
 
 In conclusion to this chapter, two ideas are central to environmental controversies: 
science and values. Science seems to be both a limiting factor as well as a catalyst for 
decision making under uncertainty. Science is present in expertise, in the PP and in 
adaptive management. Values are also present, but mostly through the precautionary 
principle. Expertise values science. Adaptive management values science and precaution 
since it leaves place for flexibility regarding the decisions. Although values and interests 
have become tantamount to knowledge, the latter still seems to remain the moving force 
in decision-making.  The following case will investigate how an environmental 
controversy was legally settled by studying the involved groups’ views on uncertainties. 
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To verify the hypothesis that different groups have different visions about 
environmental uncertainties according to their goals, I will study the KOS case that 
started as an environmental assessment in 2003 and turned into a legal dispute in 2007, 
which was finally settled in 2008. The specific groups involved were identified from the 
KOS judicial review documents and the documents available from the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Registry. The case opposes the claims and views of 
environmentalist groups to those of the oil industry, the review panel for environmental 
assessment and the government. 
To answer my question regarding the different parties’ ways to deal with 
uncertainties, I will do a discourse analysis of several documents relevant to the case. The 
discourse analysis will look into the key themes of uncertainties, scientific expertise, the 
precautionary principle and adaptive management. The views of uncertainties and its 
approaches will be also analyzed following the dimensions described by Wehling (2006) 
in chapter 2 of this work. Looking at how the different groups use those concepts in their 
argumentation and what they say or do not say about them will provide an insight into the 
interests and goals of each group in this environmental controversy (cf. Tonkiss, 2004, 
p.378). Each group is also a claim-maker. Therefore, I will also look for their rhetorical 
strategies (cf. Stocking and Holstein, 1993, p.189ff). The interactions between the groups 
are also central to understand dynamics and influences, I will study them looking at the 
contexts in which those interactions occurred and their nature.  
There are two phases to this case, one before the legal pursuit, and one during, 
which closes the debate. They are important to analyze in order to understand the 
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evolution of discourses from the different groups and also understand the escalation 
towards the legal dispute. The documents comprise letters, reports, and statements. 
Appendix A contains a detailed chronology and list of documents from the environmental 
assessment process. Also, the legal documents pertaining to the trial were analyzed, 
namely Simon Dyer’s affidavit (January 11, 2008), Justice Lamer-Tremblay’s ruling 
(March 5, 2008) and the Panel’s response to the decision (May 6, 2008). 
Since this is a very recent case, semi-structured interviews (cf. Leech, 2002) were 
carried. I however encountered a lot of reluctance from several representatives since this 
is still a very sensitive issue in Canada. The interviews and personal correspondences 
with representatives will therefore not be used for analytical purposes but rather for 
complementary information. Nonetheless, the interviews were carried with a two-fold 
intention: first to gather information and explain already available information and 
second to bring out positions regarding the key themes. For a detailed list of interviews 
and contacts see Appendix B. 
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4. Case Study: The Kearl Oil Sands Controversy 
The Albertan oil sands involve a multi-faceted and complex system including 
technological, scientific and legal aspects. Before looking in the KOS story, it is 
necessary to provide some more general information about the oil sands to understand 
how this particular story is situated in the meshwork of oil mining and environmental 
regulation in Canada. 
 
4.1 The Albertan Oil Sands  
4.1.1 The Technology 
Oil from oil sands, contrarily to crude oil, cannot simply be pumped from the 
ground. Oil sands are also called tar sands and contain a heavier form of oil called 
bitumen. The commonly used technique in the current oil sands exploitation projects is 
open-pit mining. Figure 4.1 describes how the process is carried out. The oil sands are 
located closely under the surface of the earth. After the forest is cut, “the world's largest 
trucks” dig out the overburden to uncover the oil sands, which will be also dug out to 
undergo a simple process of extraction, which requires important amounts of water and a 
number of toxic chemicals. Just to have an idea of how this technology works, the 
Alberta Energy website states, “about two tons of oil sands must be dug up, moved and 
processed to produce one barrel of oil. Roughly 75 per cent of the bitumen can be 
recovered from sand; processed sand has to be returned to the pit and the site reclaimed.” 
Tailing ponds result from digging and are filled with toxic water and sand remaining 
from the separation process.  
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Figure 4.1 Oil sands extraction processes (Imperial Oil’s Kearl website) 
Other technologies exist, like in-situ recovery. In-situ recovery entails 
technologies like cyclic steam stimulation or steam assisted gravity drainage. However, 
open-pit mining is the oldest and most commonly used technology for the biggest oil 
sands projects. Although this technology seems the most straightforward, it was not 
always the preferred one. Marsden (2007) traces a history of the Albertan oil sands’ 
exploration and exploitation. Sydney Ells, a federal mining engineer and surveyor, was 
the first to experiment with processes relying on heat to extract bitumen from the oil 
sands. This then served as a basis for both open-pit mining and in-situ technologies. At 
the same time, in 1917, he assessed the extent of the reserves in the Albertan oil sands. 
Although this is the technology used today, Marsden states that American investors and 
the Canadian government had nonetheless entertained and supported the idea to use the 
atomic bomb in oil sands fields in order to extract the oil from the tar in the 1950s. 
Nonetheless, non-proliferation treaties, supported by Canada, lead to those projects to 
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being dropped. Later on, Soviets were discovered to have undertaken similar experiments 
in the Ural and they had resulted in contaminated waters. 
The exploitation of oil sands had been taking place at an exploratory phase since 
the mid 1960s. Consistent exploitation only started at the beginning of the 1990s, when 
oil barrel prices reached a high and open-pit mining became a viable technology. Until 
that point, no other technology had proven efficient enough. Currently, there are about 80 
oil sands projects taking place or being prepared in the province of Alberta using either 
open-pit mining or in-situ technologies. There are three main oil sands fields: Athabasca, 
Cold Lake and Peace River. The Athabasca oil sands fields, located around the city of 
Fort McMurray, are the most abundant in resources and also are the ones hosting the 
largest oil sands open-pit mines1 although other kind of extracting technologies are also 
used there. Seeing the extent of the Albertan oil sands industry (see Figure 4.2), I will 
now trace a brief history of the environmental risk claims. 
 
                                                 
1 The main proposed projects in the Athabasca oil sands are: 
• Fort Hills (ran by Petro-Canada/UTS Energy Corp. / Teck Cominco),  
• Northern lights (ran by SynEnCo Energy Inc. / SinoCanada Petroleum Corp.) and  
• Kearl (ran by Imperial Oil Resources / ExxonMobil Canada) 
One major project is currently under construction: 
• Jackpine (ran by Albian Sands Energy Ltd. (Royal Dutch Shell / Chevron Canada / Marathon Oil 
Corp.)) 
And 3 major projects are currently producing: 
• Muskeg River (ran by Albian Sands Energy Ltd. (Royal Dutch Shell / Chevron Canada / Marathon 
Oil Corp.)) 
• Suncor Steepbank/Millenium (ran by Suncor) 
• Syncrude’s original mine, Aurora North and Aurora South (ran by Syncrude) 
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Figure 4.2 Map of oil sands fields in Alberta, Canada (Alberta Geological Survey) 
 
4.1.2 The Emergence of the Environmental Risk Claims 
A first phase took place between the 1990 and 1996, where the emergence of 
environmental degradation started to raise concerns. Secondly, from 1997-2005, the risk 
claims seemed to be solidified by more conclusive and independent studies as well as the 
creation of a Cumulative Effects Management Association (CEMA) especially for 
Albertan Oil sands (Spaling et al., 2000). The third phase started in 2006, where scientist 
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finally succeeded in voicing their concerns in a less marginal fashion within the scientific 
community. 
The first phase 
In the 1990s, the biological community voiced its concerns regarding the potential 
degradation of particular Canadian ecosystems like the boreal forest2 and the northern 
rivers basin. A study called AQUAMIN was conducted in 1996, investigating the impact 
of mining on the environment and significant impacts on water quality, sediment quality 
and on fish and benthic invertebrate communities3 were established (Simon Fraser 
University think-tank, 2002, p.307). In 1996 as well, another publicly funded project, the 
Northern River Basins Study (NRBS) closed five-year research efforts with a series of 
recommendations for provincial and federal governments. In a teamwork uniting expert 
and lay-experts4, like First Nation people, an environmental assessment of the area was 
conducted. In their lengthy report, they expressed concerns over the oil sands near Fort 
McMurray and the land disturbance that their exploitation caused. Furthermore, worries 
about the efficiency and safety of tailing ponds were also voiced regarding potential leaks 
and contamination. (NRBS website).  
The second phase 
In 1998, the Northern River Basin Initiative set out to make a follow up on the 
NRBS recommendations under the form of policies and further research. The follow up 
                                                 
2 The boreal forest is an old-growth forest, which means it took a very long time for it to exist without 
significant anthropogenic disturbances. 
3 Benthic communities are the ones that live at the bottom of an aquatic system. They are usually good 
indicators of ecosystem health since they do not have a very high trophic level, which means that many 
other animals feed on them. 
4 Aboriginal leaders, government officials, municipal representatives, members of the environmental, 
health, agricultural, industrial and public sectors designed projects. Private companies, individuals, 
government agencies and educational institutions conducted the scientific work.  
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on previous governmental projects shows the growing concerns in answer to the concerns 
raised a few years beforehand. 
More publications came out with a more specific focus on the problems created 
by oil sands exploitation. Bendell-Young and colleagues (2000), ecologists at Simon 
Fraser University, published a study looking at how oil companies were reclaiming sites 
and creating tailing ponds, which by gradual5 seeping transformed the surrounding areas 
into wetlands6. Both the industry and the government financed this study. Selecting a 
series of ecological parameters to measure and comparing them to those of already 
existing wetlands, they tried to determine whether those newly created wetlands were 
stable on their own. The result of their study suggested that at least fish would not be able 
to live in such environments and that it could also have consequences for migratory birds. 
The intention of oil companies to use these wetlands as reclaimed areas would then not 
be as successful as they would need to be.  
Also, Environment Canada required an assessment for the cumulative effects 
resulting from oil sands developments in Alberta. In this report, they set out a list of 
objectives and priorities in the cumulative effects assessments. They also instated the role 
of the Cumulative Effect Management Association (CEMA), a non-profit and non-
governmental organisation, in managing the 17 oil sands exploitation projects up to date. 
CEMA does not only assemble scientific knowledge for monitoring and setting 
environmental thresholds but it reproduces what the NRBS did by including different 
communities and particularly the industries exploiting the oil sands: “Economic reality is 
                                                 
5 This is another characteristic of ecological studies; they usually occur a while after a disturbance has 
occurred since ecosystem processes are often not spontaneously noticeable. 
6 Lands mostly saturated with water and welcoming particular species to that habitat 
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as embedded in CEMA as are its principles of multi-stakeholder partnership and 
consensus decision making.” (Spaling et al., 2000)  
The third phase 
An important step in the assembly of the environmental problem claim in the 
scientific community was the publication of the inaugural article (May issue 2006) in the 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America 
(PNAS) by Dr. David Schindler, a renowned ecologist in the field of aquatic ecosystems, 
and WF Donahue. In this paper, Schindler and Donahue were able to link empirically the 
threat of oil sands exploitation not only to local ecological threats, as it had been the 
focus of regional studies, but also to regional environmental problems. Their focus was 
on the water availability and quality throughout the Western Prairie Provinces (WPP) in 
Canada. They suggested that, “if the trends described above continue, the combination of 
climate warming, increases in human populations and industry, and historic drought is 
likely to cause an unprecedented water crisis in the WPP. The resulting decrease in water 
quantity will contribute to declining water quality, as described below. This decline will 
exacerbate the water crisis in the WPP.” (Schindler and Donahue, 2006). They also 
particularly underline the ecological and societal disaster that will be brought about by 
the current regime of oil sands exploitation7. 
 
                                                 
7 They write, ”Currently, the oil sands consume three to six barrels of water per barrel of oil produced. 
Unless future water use is curtailed, oil-sands development will require {approx}45 m3·s–1 of water supply 
by 2020, based on recent estimates. This is the equivalent of nearly half of the Athabasca River's low 
winter flow during eight of the years since 1980 and in every year since 1999. The Athabasca and Peace 
rivers are critical for ecological sustenance of the Peace-Athabasca Delta World Heritage Site at the rivers' 
confluence, which is home to several thousand aboriginal people. The vast Delta wetlands are already 
exhibiting negative effects of declining water supply from climate change and the Bennett Dam on the 
Peace, but large industrial oil-sands projects in the Athabasca drainage and reservoirs on the Peace River 
continue to be proposed and approved.” (Schindler and Donahue, 2006.) 
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Overall, the claimed environmental risks associated with the exploitation of oil 
sands in Alberta are the drought of the Athabasca River, the contamination of the rivers 
and soil, the disturbance of landscapes with the intensive deforestation and the leaking of 
tailing ponds creating instable wetlands ecosystems, and finally the ecological instability 
of reclaimed site.  
It has been acknowledged that the uses of this technology as well as its 
environmental impacts need to be managed and controlled. The following section will 
thus draw out how this process is done in Canada, and particularly for the oil sands. 
 
4.1.3 Canada’s Environmental Legal Landscape 
4.1.3.1 The Regulatory Process 
There are two levels of regulation in Canada: federal and provincial. When an oil 
sands project entails landscape modifications and overlaps federal and provincial 
authority, both authorities carry out an environmental assessment. In order to make the 
process more effective, the federal government has signed agreements with each of the 
provinces and territories to carry out a joint environmental assessment. The Canada-
Alberta Agreement on Environmental assessment cooperation was enacted in 1999 and 
lastly updated in 2005.  It stipulates that environmental assessment should be conducted 
respecting two acts, the Alberta’s Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act 
(EPEA) and Canada’s Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA). Although not 
all landscape-modifying activities require an environmental assessment, oil sands do 
require one and the proponent of the project is charged to carry it on by producing an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). There is an extensive list of information 
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stipulated by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (the Agency) in the Terms 
of Reference (TOR) that the proponent has to include in the EIA. There are three types of 
reviews in environmental assessment: a screening (CEAA, ss. 18-20), a comprehensive 
study (CEAA, ss. 21-24), and mediation and panel reviews (CEAA, ss. 29-36). In the 
case of larger projects entailing significant uncertainties, the federal government selects 
the latter one, a Panel of independent experts whose main task is to review the EIA and 
hold public hearings. During those hearings, everyone related to or affected by the project 
is welcome to voice its opinion and rationale on different points of concerns. After 
compiling all those opinions, the Joint Panel formulates recommendations, which are 
then sent to the provincial regulatory authorities. The different cabinets will then have the 
decisional power to approve or not the projects. In the case of oil sands in Alberta, the 
former Energy Utility Board (EUB), which split into the Energy Resources Conservation 
Board (ERCB) and the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC) as of January 1, 2008, was 
usually the one handing out the permits. However, since the oilfields are located along 
the Athabasca River and the oil industry heavily uses its waters, the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) becomes often the main authority for delivering permits.  
The environmental assessment regulatory process therefore depends on the type of 
activity and the region where it is carried. There is no one standard environmental 
assessments process. The one described above is the one that usually takes place for large 
oil sands mines in the Athabasca oil sands fields.  
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4.1.3.2 The Legal Background: the EPEA and CEAA 
The EPEA and the CEAA are the two most important acts governing the 
environmental assessment of oil sands in Alberta. Both acts were first established in 1992 
with various amendments over the years. They also describe the regulation of 
environmental assessment, the different organs and how they interact with each other.  
The EPEA in Alberta is subdivided in 11 parts, which detail the above-described 
procedures of environmental assessment. The highlights of this act are the description of 
the purposes of environmental assessment in section 40 which are  
“(a) to support the goals of environmental protection and sustainable 
development, (b) to integrate environmental protection and economic decisions at the 
earliest stages of planning an activity, (c) to predict the environmental, social, economic 
and cultural consequences of a proposed activity and to assess plans to mitigate any 
adverse impacts resulting from the proposed activity, and (d) to provide for the 
involvement of the public, proponents, the Government and Government agencies in the 
review of proposed activities.” (EPEA, s. 40) 
The roles of environmental protection and sustainable development are also defined in 
section 2: “(a) the protection of the environment is essential to the integrity of ecosystems 
and human health and to the well-being of society” and “(c) the principle of sustainable 
development, which ensures that the use of resources and the environment today does not 
impair prospects for their use by future generations”. (EPEA s.2) 
At the federal level, the CEAA has the same fundamental principles as the EPEA 
in Alberta, i.e. “to achieve sustainable development by conserving and enhancing 
environmental quality and by encouraging and promoting economic development that 
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conserves and enhances environmental quality.” (CEAA, Preamble). The main difference 
between the EPEA and the CEAA is that the provincial law goes into detail about what is 
acceptable regarding the level of the release of substances, contaminated sites, 
conservation and reclamation, potable water, hazardous substances and pesticides, and 
finally waste and recycling. Whereas the federal law limits itself to describing how 
environmental assessment should be done and which activities must submit to it. This 
shows a lot of autonomy at the provincial level in determining up to what point the 
environment should be preserved or conserved.  
 
 
Within this context, I will analyse a specific case where actors evaluated the use 
of open-pit mining, elaborated solutions to environmental concerns and enacted laws and 
regulations using them to meet their objectives. I will show how this story has shaped the 
understanding and management of the complex Albertan oil-sands system. 
 
4.2 The Kearl Oil Sands Project, how a controversy arose  
In 2003 Imperial Oil, one of Canada’s largest petroleum companies took over an 
old exploitation project, the Kearl Oil Sands (KOS) project that ExxonMobil had initiated 
in 1997 but not carried out. Like other mining projects, it filed for regulatory approval in 
2005 and provided an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency (the Agency). Due to the scope of the project, a Joint 
Panel was to assess and review the EIA and hold public hearings, which took place in 
November 2006. Finally, in February 2007 the Panel issued the recommendation for the 
regulatory authority, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), to approve the KOS 
Robaey                                                                                                                  MA ESST 2008                                                                    




project. The environmental impacts were judged to be insignificant provided Imperial Oil 
implemented its mitigation measures (in Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development 
v. Canada (Attorney General) (2008 FC 302) T-535-07, [March 5, 2008]).  
Immediately after the DFO’s approval based on the Joint Panel’s report, the 
Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development, Prairie Acid Rain Coalition, Sierra Club 
of Canada and Toxics Watch Society of Alberta (the Coalition) filed a complain claiming 
that the environmental assessment of the Kearl Project had been done unlawfully. The 
accusations concerned the illegitimate approval of the Cumulative Effects Management 
Association (CEMA), endangered species and greenhouse gas emissions in Imperial Oil’s 
EIA. Justice Lamer-Tremblay settled the case on March 5, 2008. The Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) was the main legal document on which the 
ruling was based. According to the Judge, the central tenets of this act are the 
precautionary principle and adaptive management. She weighed each party’s arguments 
against these tenets and the two fundamental steps of the CEAA i.e.: environmental 
assessment and decision and follow-up. She concluded that only the lack of rationale for 
mitigating significant carbon dioxide emissions in the Panel report was unlawful and 
asked them to review only this part of the report. 
This marked a partial victory for the Coalition, which took an unexpected turn of 
event. The DFO pulled out Imperial’s permit following the ruling thereby halting the 
KOS project’s developments. Imperial then sued them for taking away the license and 
claiming important damages as the result of delays. However, Mr. Justice de Montigny 
ruled against them on March 27, 2008, on the grounds that their claims for delays and 
damages were not precise enough to be justified. (Imperial Oil Resources Venture 
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Limited v. Minister of Fisheries and Oceans (2008 FC 382) T-460-08. March 27, 2008.) 
Imperial appealed this decision but was turned down again on May 14, 2008 by Mr. 
Justice Campbell (Imperial Oil Resources Venture Limited v. Minister of Fisheries and 
Oceans (2008 FC 598) T-460-08. Date May 14, 2008). 
In the end, on May 6, 2008, the Joint Panel produced an addendum to its report as 
required to by the Judge. This addendum stated that the governments of Alberta and 
Canada would be the ones regulating carbon dioxide. No further actions were pursued 
from the Coalition and Imperial Oil was allowed to resume the Kearl Project on June 5, 
2008. 
The KOS judicial review is a first in the history of the Albertan oil sands 
exploitation. Although it only momentarily halted the KOS developments, it brought 
national attention to the environmental impacts created by the oil sands industry and 
shook up the power relations between government, industry and environmentalist groups. 
The events and dynamics uncovered through the KOS trial allow studying how different 
groups talk about environmental risks and uncertainties.  
 
4.3 The Actors 
4.3.1 The Operator: Imperial Oil 
Imperial Oil is Canada’s largest oil company. It was created as the result of a 
merger between several Southern-Ontarian refiners in 1880 (Imperial Oil website). 
Imperial Oil began installing refineries in Alberta in 1923 and slowly established itself as 
the province’s biggest refiner with enlarged facilities (Klassen, 1999, p. 144). The big 
break that launched the company to the top was the discovery of Leduc oil field in 
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Alberta in 1947. This not only settled Imperial Oil’s stronghold in this province but also 
placed it as Canada’s biggest oil company (Klassen, 1999, pp.125-126). Imperial Oil also 
became a local symbol for mass production and innovation in businesses in Alberta. It 
consolidated its empire by contributing to the creation of long-distance pipeline (Klassen, 
1999, pp.144-146) establishing itself at all levels of the oil industry’s technological 
system: production, refinery and transport. In 1985, Imperial Oil started exploiting oil 
sands and using its refineries to produce crude oil from it. It did so by creating 
subsidiaries and investing with other oil companies. For instance, it owns the oil sands 
project in Cold Lake and also owns 25% of the Syncrude mine in Fort McMurray 
(Klassen, 1999, p147). Imperial is also part of the larger international petroleum industry 
since 69.6% of its stocks belong to the American ExxonMobil. 
In most documents that were analyzed, Imperial Oil is referred to either as “the 
proponent” or “the operator”. In the Canadian system, the proponent has to justify that its 
project is in the public interest. Recently, environmental issues around the exploitation of 
oil sands have taken a high priority on questions regarding the public interest primarily 
for human health and First Nation livelihood reasons. For large projects like the KOS 
project, Imperial not only invests in the industrial development itself but also in these 
other important issues. An Environmental and Regulatory manager, a Stakeholder 
Relations advisor and an Aboriginal Affairs advisor are responsible only for the KOS 
project itself. Moreover, on its website, Imperial prides itself for environmental 
responsibility highlighting sound use of technologies since 1918. As Canada’s largest oil 
company, Imperial Oil has a lot of responsibilities towards citizens and the environment. 
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4.3.2 The Regulator: different governmental bodies involved 
There are several governmental bodies involved in any natural resource exploiting 
projects. Although many of them have regulatory power, it does not mean they have 
decisional power. In the KOS case, the DFO was the only one to have decisional power 
since the project entailed significant water use from the Athabasca River.  
The DFO is nonetheless not alone in its decision-making role. Different cabinets 
have a counselling responsibility and the DFO only takes a decision after the Joint 
Review Panel appointed by the Agency emits a recommendation. This recommendation 
is the result of a public participatory process involving lay-people, specialist consultants 
and other governmental bodies. In the end, when the Review Panel recommends specific 
management plans, it refers to the regulator to help Imperial Oil keep up the conditions to 
its approval. In the KOS case, the regulator is Alberta Environment (AENV) and 
Environment Canada (EC). 
The DFO, AENV and EC all have for mission Canada’s sustainability. They all 
mostly provide monitoring, surveys and expert reports. Therefore, their regulatory role 
lies in the monitoring and application of environmental management guidelines 
elaborated throughout the process of the KOS project environmental assessment. 
 Independent actors nominated by the government 
The Joint Panel and the federal judges are independent actors that are appointed 
by the government. In the KOS case, three independent members were appointed to the 
Joint Panel, one from the federal government and two from the provincial government. 
Only biographical elements of the federally appointed member were available. 
Information gathered from interviews and other available documents suggested that the 
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two other members were members of the former EUB of Alberta although their 
biography was never officially published. Although the Joint Panel is an independent 
body, its views were put before a court next to Imperial Oil in the KOS case, thereby 
questioning its independence. The federal judges are the ones ultimately deciding the 
right and wrong in the issue and do not participate in the debate with any other groups, 
they are in that sense truly independent.   
 
4.3.3 The Oil Sands Environmental Coalition and the Coalition 
Before the judicial review 
 
The groups involved in the negotiations around the KOS project before the 
judicial review of the Panel report were called the Oil Sands Environmental Coalition 
(OSEC). They are an association of three Alberta-based environmentalist groups: the Fort 
McMurray Environmental Association (FMEA), the Toxics Watch Society of Alberta 
(TWSA) and the Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development. These groups 
essentially have the same mission as governmental bodies such as AENV and EC. What 
is then their purpose and why do they exist? Glitches in the environmental assessment 
and the regulatory process might occur and independent bodies are necessary in order to 
act as both a consultant for better environmental management practices and as a 
watchdog for environmental and human health. 
TWSA and the Pembina Institute were both created in the 1980s as a result of 
environmental stresses and problems affecting human health. The Pembina Institute was 
created in 1985 following Canada’s largest public inquiry in the 1982 Lodgepole sour gas 
blowout that resulted in the death of two persons and heavy air pollution in Alberta 
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(Pembina Institute website). On their website, they describe their origins as “a small 
group of local residents [who] band[ed] together to press for higher safety standards in 
the oil and gas industry ... [and who were] empowered by the positive experience of 
citizen-lead action … to found the Pembina Institute in 1985.” (Pembina Institute 
website) TWSA was created shortly after in 1986 “as ‘a needed and timely response to 
the growing use of toxic chemicals in our province.’” (TWSA website). The FMEA is a 
local group to the city of Fort McMurray, which is located 70 km away from most large 
oil sands mining pits. OSEC can therefore be considered as a consortium of grassroots 
environmental movements.  
However, TWSA and the Pembina Institute do not only perform advocacy 
activities as a reaction to environmental problems but they also provide consultancy 
services. They are hybrids in the environmentalist movement domain. On the one hand 
they will lobby to protect the environment and citizens and on the other hand they will 
provide expert advice on how to deal with industrial effects in an environmentally 
friendly way.  The largest of these is the Pembina Institute with offices in several 
Canadian cities including the Capital. They are very active in providing environmental 
consulting expertise to several oil companies and have distanced themselves from a 
grassroots type organization towards a consultancy type enterprise.    
 
During the judicial review 
At this point, OSEC is not the group pursuing the KOS case it is now the 
Coalition. This term refers to the Pembina Institute, TWSA, and three important actors 
who were recruited for the legal pursuit. The Pembina Institute was however the group 
orchestrating it all. The Sierra Club of Canada, Ecojustice, formerly Sierra Legal Defence 
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Fund and the Prairie Acid Rain Coalition (PARC) were the new additions. While these 
are all environmentalist organizations, they are not of the same scope. On the one hand, 
PARC is another grassroots type organization whose most prominent member was 
Martha Kostuch. A retired veterinarian, she became an environmental activist after 
noticing the effect of oil industry’s air pollution on cattle’s reproductive system 
(Canadian Geographic Archives; Marshall, 2004, p.7). On the other hand, the Sierra Club 
is the oldest North-American group for wildlife conservation advocacy and it was 
founded by John Muir along with other American intellectuals in 1892. Its goals were 
“recreational, educational, and conservationist” (Cohen, 1988, Chapter 3). Through time, 
it became one of the leading groups for environmental advocacy in the U.S., it started 
acting in Canada in 1963 and was finally established in Ottawa in 1989 (Sierra Club of 
Canada website). Ecojustice only officially exists since September 2007 but had been 
active in Canada under the name of Sierra Legal for the last 17 years (Ecojustice 
website).  
 
 To sum up, the actors involved in the KOS story are very high-profile actors: the 
biggest oil company, the government, several grassroots environmental groups that can 
recruit larger influential groups like the Sierra Club. This makes this sensitive issue even 
more visible to the public and the story even more important.  
 
The controversy around the KOS project lies mainly in the questioning of the 
environmental assessment process, which is there to insure the projects are in the interet 
of the public. It is also a dispute on uncertainties regarding predictions, technological 
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effects and environmental management, of which different groups have different visions. 
The following discourse analysis will provide a detailed look into each group’s interests 
and strategies and will show how the judicial review participated in the social 
construction of an environmental problem. 
 
 
4.4 The Negotiation of Uncertainties 
4.4.1 Conflicting Views before the Trial 
 All the documents submitted to the Joint Panel are relevant to the making of the 
Panel report and also allow a better understanding of each group’s discourses. The 
following documents were not in question as such in the trial since the judicial review 
only looked at the Panel report. However, the Judge did refer directly to Imperial Oil’s 
EIA as it was a significant document in the making of the Panel report. Nonetheless, all 
of the following documents participated in the elaboration of both the EIA and the Panel 
report, making them thus relevant. 
 
4.4.1.1 Terms of Reference 
As previously mentioned, the terms of reference (TOR) is the document produced 
by the Agency, which provides an extensive list of information to be included in the 
proponents Environmental Impacts Assessment (EIA). The elaboration of the TOR is the 
first step in the environmental assessment process.  
It was initiated on November 7, 2003 through a letter and public notice from 
Imperial Oil to the DFO, which stated that the KOS project had been initiated in 1997 by 
Exxon Mobil and would be resumed by Imperial Oil in 2003. A TOR that had been 
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drafted in 1998 was no longer valid in 2003. An interesting quote from the public notice 
is the following, “considering TOR have evolved for oil sands mining projects since then, 
as have certain aspects of the projects, Alberta Environment has determined that a more 
current TOR is needed.” The necessity to revise the TOR after five years suggests that 
concerns in the field of environmental health have changed. A letter followed this public 
notice from the Agency to the DFO on November 18, 2003 requiring more information 
on impacts on fish and fish habitat and referring the DFO to an impact assessment 
biologist. On December 22, 2003, the Agency contacted AENV to invite them in a 
cooperative environmental assessment review of the project. This brought in new 
governmental bodies such as Environment Canada, Health Canada and Natural resources 
of Canada in the consulting arena. In this communication, the Agency also included a list 
of modifications that should be added to the TOR. These modifications concerned mostly 
the identification of environmental uncertainties and their management. Also the Agency 
demanded, “uncertainties [to] … be quantified whenever possible, or assigned to 
categories according to the degree of uncertainty” and “ [to] provide statistical confidence 
limits or another quantitative measurement of uncertainty in predictive tools and 
methods”. On the same day, the CEAA also contacted Imperial Oil to inform them that 
the DFO would be the main responsible authority. Then, on January 7, 2004, the DFO, as 
the responsible authority, urged Imperial Oil to provide more information in order to 
determine the level of environmental assessment. Finally, AENV published the final 
TOR on April 22, 2004.  
In this final document, there is a 30 page long list of information the proponent 
has to present. Among the requirements, there are three types of activities that are 
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remarkable: (1) the identification of uncertainties and how to go about them, 
“Differentiate between emerging issues with uncertainties, issues with important 
environmental consequences and issues that can be mitigated through available 
technology and with existing management approaches. Describe how ongoing 
uncertainties and emerging issues will be addressed”, (2) the adaptability of mitigation 
measures, “Identify any implications that those possible climate changes might have for 
the sustainability of the Project. Discuss any follow-up programs and adaptive 
management considerations” and (3) the specification of uncertainties through models, 
“Habitat models used to evaluate impacts should be modified/calibrated by comparing 
model predictions with wildlife data from the study areas”. 
There are several things notable in the elaboration of the TOR. First, only two 
groups were involved in its elaboration: the oil industry and the government. Second, it 
shows a one-way dynamic with demands from the government to Imperial Oil for what 
has to be in the EIA. Within the government, different bodies interacted regarding the 
content of the TOR but did so in unison.  What really happens with the TOR is that the 
government creates a set of requirements that will frame the kind of discourse Imperial 
Oil will have in its EIA. The interests of Imperial Oil are to follow the directives in order 
to get their projects approved, whereas the government tries to provide a set of 
requirements that will insure that the project does not contain significant uncertainties 
with detrimental effects to both human and environmental health. 
Regarding uncertainties, only the government’s discourse is present. What can be 
observed about their request is that they regard uncertainties in a classical way requiring “ 
a range of possible outcomes” (cf. Smithson, 1993; cf. Collingridge, 1980). Prediction 
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models and a science-based approach to uncertainties seem to have a very big part in how 
they deal with them. “More information” is an expression that comes up often and the 
requirement for expertise goes hand in hand with it. Another approach to understanding 
how the governmental bodies perceive uncertainties is that adaptive management is 
referred to directly, but also indirectly by establishing “environmental management 
procedures should monitoring indicate that mitigation strategies are not effective”.  
Expertise and adaptive management are the lines of thought that the government seems to 
endorse at this initial stage of the environmental assessment process. 
In terms of Wehling’s dimensions (2006), the government’s views on 
uncertainties could be qualified with a high score on the axis of knowledge, meaning that 
uncertainties have to be specified. This is motivated by the government’s interests to 
provide a comprehensive list of issues to be addressed and clarified in order to make sure 
that the approval of the project is in everyone’s best interests. On the axis of temporality, 
the government’s discourse seems to consider uncertainties as temporary since 
management techniques such as prediction models, follow-up plans and adaptive 
management are sufficient answers to the specified uncertainties. Finally, on the axis of 
intentionality, uncertainties are unintended since in the discourse, there is no ambiguity 
that the government considers uncertainties as the inevitable side effects of industrial 
development. 
 
4.4.1.2 Environmental Impacts Assessment 
After the first step of elaborating TOR, Imperial Oil spent over a year producing 
its Environmental Impacts Assessment that was finally submitted to the former EUB of 
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Alberta and to AENV on July 1, 2005. The document consists of 9 volumes altogether 
covering technical, environmental, social and economical issues in the KOS project. 
In the executive summary, Imperial Oil stated, “the environmental impact 
assessment concluded that, with mitigation and adaptive management, there would be no 
unacceptable environmental, health, or socio-economic effects from the project.” (EIA, 
2005, Vol.1 p. xix) and suggested that “the proposed Kearl Oil Sands Project - Mine 
Development is in the public interest of Alberta and Canada and requests that it be 
approved.” (ibid.). The aims of Imperial Oil are to have their project approved and in the 
summary of a document which contains over 8000 pages their discourse needed to be 
assertive to leave no place for uncertainties. How did they develop such a firm 
conclusion? A closer look at the 9 volumes of the EIA will provide an insight into this 
discourse. Since it is a quite extensive document, the following part will be divided into 
the following themes: (1) interactions, (2) uncertainties, and (3) approaches to 
uncertainties. 
 
Interactions with other actors 
 As a result of a multi-stakeholder process (EIA, 2005, Vol. 2 p. 2-5), the write-up 
of this document is a collaborative effort between Imperial Oil, other oil companies, 
citizen groups, the government and environmental NGOs (ENGOs). Consultants were 
also hired in the process. However, only the meetings between Imperial Oil, the 
government and the ENGOs are of interest for this study. In volume 2 of the EIA, it is 
stated that OSEC met with Imperial Oil on Sept 8, 2004 to discuss its involvement in the 
KOS project. On March 2, 2005, Imperial Oil met with the Pembina Institute, which 
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expressed its interest as a consultancy organization to participate in the KOS project 
although they will later reveal they did not have time to be involved (see part 4.4.1.3 of 
this chapter). On March 29, 2004, “Imperial Oil met with AENV to review the proposed 
EIA Terms of Reference. AENV indicated that new requirements would include: Climate 
Change, quantification of EIA modeling uncertainties, and discussion of mitigation 
measures for regional cumulative impacts.” (EIA, 2005, Vol.2 p. 2-24-27). 
The information from those meetings suggests the government’s stronghold on 
the EIA. The lack of follow-up with environmentalists groups shows again their lack of 
power in influencing the environmental assessment process at this point in time. 
 
Uncertainties 
The most straightforward way to understand Imperial’s vision of uncertainties is 
to look at the glossary. In the first volume’s glossary, they defined the term: “uncertainty 
[as an] [i]mperfect level of knowledge concerning the present or future state of the 
system under consideration; a component of risk resulting from imperfect knowledge of 
the degree of hazard or of its spatial and temporal distribution” (EIA, 2005, Vol.1 
Glossary p.8).  
Although the executive summary seems to have left no place for uncertainties, the 
term does come up in the remaining of the EIA. It is interesting to highlight discrepancies 
in the use of this “imperfect form of knowledge” (Ibid.) concerning different issues 
within the EIA. It is always used in the sense in which it is defined, but different attitudes 
in different fields towards uncertainties, are visible.  
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In the economical domain, they put the following notice in the introduction, 
“Please note that this application contains forward-looking information on future 
production, project start-ups and future capital spending. Actual results could differ 
materially due to changes in project schedules, operating performance, demand for oil 
and gas, commercial negotiations or other technical and economic factors.” (EIA, 2005, 
Vol. 1 p. 1-5). This acknowledges uncertainties and cites different parameters that could 
interfere with predictions. 
In the engineering domain, technical and environmental uncertainties are used to 
dismiss technological alternatives. For example, the EIA is the required to provide 
alternative means of carrying out a task. For instance Imperial needed to use the water 
from the Muskeg River and suggested five ways of doing so, four including no river-
diversion and one including river diversion. Three of the four no river-diversion 
alternatives were rejected on grounds of "a negative effect on the mine and external 
tailings area”, “technical uncertainties associated with flushing pore water from tailings” 
and "a negative effect on a low-flow river, caused by seepage collection wells” (EIA, 
2005, Vol. 1 p11-8). Here uncertainties are associated to the functioning of the 
technology and are a sufficient reason to reject an alternative. Moreover, the fourth no 
river-diversion alternative was also rejected mainly on grounds of environmental 
uncertainties since the “level of certainty with this alternative in ensuring protection of 
the natural aquatic systems along the upper reaches of the Muskeg River is considered 
low.” (EIA, 2005, Vol. 1 p 11-14).  The environmental uncertainties are presented here 
are as a “low certainty” demonstrating the importance of the knowledge dimension. 
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Therefore, the possible effects on the environment can be used as a reason for not using a 
particular technology.  
What were then Imperial Oil’s attitudes towards uncertainties in the 
environmental field? Imperial seemed to have three different levels of uncertainties in 
environmental topics: (1) the uncertainties about environmental parameters, (2) the 
uncertainties in predicting and (3) the uncertainties about environmental mitigation. 
 Uncertainties about environmental parameters were present in Imperial’s EIA. For 
example, air quality is a big issue. Imperial states, “there remains uncertainty about the 
sources of ozone in northeastern Alberta. There are several plausible, but contradictory 
theories regarding ozone formation in northeastern Alberta, which are not being 
addressed by current research” (2005, Vol. 5 p. 2-146) and “uncertainties remain with 
some of the individual TRS8, VOC9, PAH10 and metal species; however the best available 
regional data was used to represent these compounds in the assessment” (2005, Vol.5 p.2-
172). The available data and conservative estimates were sufficient and did not hinder 
them from proceeding with their predictions since “there is high confidence that the 
dispersion model and the modelling approach used will provide conservative air quality 
predictions” (2005, Vol. 5 p.2-116). 
 Since the available data was uncertain, there would be uncertainties in future 
estimates added to the imperfect nature of prediction models. Imperial heavily used 
mathematical models to correct predictions about environmental effects like CALPUFF 
or predict what the baseline would be without industrial development like RELAD (2005, 
Vol.5, p. 2-134-135; Vol. 5 Appendix 2B). Also, “both sensitivity analyses and a rigorous 
                                                 
8 Total reduced sulfur 
9 Volatile organic compounds 
10 Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 
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analysis of model uncertainty were used to quantify the degree of uncertainty in the 
model output, and to strengthen the confidence in model results”(2005, Vol. 6, p. 3-16). 
Here the key word is confidence. The attitude about uncertainties in predictions therefore 
has the aim of transforming uncertainties into certainties through mathematical 
transformations. This approach to uncertainties is widely used and recognized in 
environmental assessment and supported by AENV (2005, Vol.5, p. 2-134-135).  
 Finally, uncertainties mitigation scenarios result from all those previous 
uncertainties. For instance “uncertainty in the composition and structure of reclaimed 
upland and wetlands communities makes it difficult to assign specific ecosite phases or 
wetlands types (or associated wildlife biodiversity index values) to the reclaimed 
landscape” (2005, Vol. 7 p.4-7). Also, “effects on vegetation resulting from changing 
climates might affect certainty of reclamation goal achievement” (2005, Vol. 7 p. 4-9). 
What is noticeable from these quotes is that uncertainty became a justification for an 
uncertain reclamation plan and schedule11.  
Imperial Oil had different attitudes to uncertainties among fields and talked about 
environmental uncertainties at different levels. In the environmental field Imperial Oil 
approached uncertainties firstly as unknown ecosystem parameters in the case of effects 
and future mitigation and secondly as correctable mathematical objects. The diverse 
outlooks on the term uncertainty involved a set of rhetorical tools around this notion. 
Stocking and Holstein (1993, p.192) talk about rhetorical tools for ignorance claims. 
Among them are caveats, where scientists recognize their limitations in their findings and 
                                                 
11 What is surprising is that climate change is considered as something external to the activities of Imperial 
Oil and treated as a variable creating uncertainty in mitigation plans. Meanwhile Imperial is also 
contributing to greenhouse gases emissions and is required to mitigate them as well as it is recognized that 
they contribute to climate change. Although it is not the sole contributor to greenhouse gases, it still has a 
local responsibility in climate related issues. 
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thereby explain they have done the best they could. This sort of rhetoric is the one 
Imperial used when talking about uncertainties. “Conservative predictions” and 
uncertainty analyses contributed to showing caveats and thereby bringing credibility to 
the ignorance/uncertainty claims. 
 
Approaches to uncertainties 
 As a means of responding to uncertainties, Imperial used two related concepts. 
First, they showed a strong trust in scientific ‘progress’ and second they only relied on 
adaptive management to answer to uncertainties. Imperial’s trust in research and 
development is clearly stated such as in Volume 7, they mention “ongoing research 
[which] continues to address areas of uncertainty in the system.” (2005, Vol. 7, p. 3-52). 
Expertise is central to specifying uncertainties. Therefore Imperial Oil invested 
considerable amounts of money in R&D like its $10 million contribution to the Imperial 
Oil Centre for Oil Sands Innovation at the University of Alberta whose “mandate … is to 
find more efficient, economically viable and environmentally responsible ways to 
develop Canada’s oil-sands resources” (2005, Vol. 2 p.4-6). 
 Hand in hand with expertise comes adaptive management. Defined as a six-step 
cycle in the EIA it entailed the following: 
• “assessing the risk of potential challenges, uncertainties and opportunities 
• incorporating design elements that accommodate challenges, contingencies and 
knowledge acquisition 
• implementing the design 
• monitoring key indicators 
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• evaluating performance 
• incorporating knowledge gained into existing processes and the design of future 
facilities and operations” (2005, Vol.1 p.2-41) 
Although it is clearly defined, Imperial did not discuss the shortcomings of adaptive 
management like the extent of monitoring needed, the stability of uncertainties and the 
limiting frames in which adaptive management understands a system (see chapter 2, this 
work). Instead it was one of its core principles for reclamation (2005, Vol 7. p. 4-82). 
 Not only did Imperial ignore the shortcomings of its approaches to adaptive 
management, it also ignored the limitations of the expertise model developed by Van der 
Daele (see chapter 2, this work). Imperial’s trust in “on-going research” showed their 
belief that if experts discuss enough within their community they will find a solution. 
Imperial nonetheless used a multi-stakeholder process, which included lay-knowledge. 
However, since they seemed to rely mostly on the scientific community to find solutions, 
the multi-stakeholder process may need improvement. All in all, Imperial has a classical 
view of uncertainties. The outcomes are known but their probability of occurring is not 
and they are linked to risk. In terms of Wehling’s dimensions, Imperial’s vision of 
uncertainties appears to be highly specified, temporary and unintended. 
 
The discourse about uncertainties was accompanied by a discourse of 
controllability. It is seen in the attitudes toward the notion of uncertainties for instance as 
something correctable and also in the approaches to dealing with uncertainties using 
expertise and adaptive management. In addition, Imperial Oil referred to the work that 
has been done by governmental and non-governmental initiatives (CEMA and Regional 
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Sustainable Development Strategy) and “the main environmental concerns associated 
with the Kearl project are similar to those previously identified and currently managed by 
the oil sands industry.” (EIA, 2005, Vol. 1 p. 2-35). Also Imperial stated, “for most 
aspects of these projects, the project components and environmental interactions are well 
understood.” (EIA, 2005, Vol. 1 p. 2-41). Their discourse shows that environmental 
issues are known and understood, therefore controllable. Strategically speaking, they 
created themselves what Latour would call allies (cf. Latour, 1988). Imperial seems to put 
a lot of effort in specifying uncertainties in order to provide an impression of 
controllability over this “component of [environmental] risk” (2005, Vol.1, Glossary p.8). 
Rhetorical tools like caveats and allies along with their vision of uncertainties all work 
for their interests, which are to see the KOS project resume.  
 
Summary 
So far in the story even before the EIA was produced, it was predictable that 
Imperial and the government would have the same vision of uncertainties since the TOR 
had a framing function. The previous analyses showed how Imperial succeeded in 
keeping the same discourse as the government about uncertainties through rhetorical 
tools like using caveats and allies and by having a similar vision of uncertainties to the 
government by relying on expertise and adaptive management. In this way, Imperial and 
the government’s interests seem to be mutually fulfilled. 
Robaey                                                                                                                  MA ESST 2008                                                                    




4.4.1.3 Initial Exchange between OSEC and Imperial Oil 
After the submission of the EIA, different groups were invited to voice their 
opinion to the Joint Panel. On October 31, 2005, OSEC sent a letter (Statement of 
concern) to AENV and EUB, with a copy to the Panel. In this letter, they supported that 
the KOS project is not in the public interest and undertook the position that no oil sands 
project should be “considered” until a regional planning for oil sands development would 
be put into place. They also wrote that they had been too busy to fully participate in the 
EIA as consultants but wanted to contribute through the Review Panel. Moreover, 
documents showed that OSEC was one of the four organisms to receive federal funding 
to produce their contribution to the Review Panel.  
In the letter, they cited the “significant uncertainties regarding the recently 
announced Mineable Oil Sands Strategy and its implications for the Muskeg River 
Watershed and the work of the CEMA” (p.1-2), which are environmental mitigation 
frameworks and management organisation. More precisely, they expressed concern 
towards the “insufficient resources … dedicated to research, development and the 
piloting of alternative technologies offering superior environmental performance” (p.2), “ 
Imperial Oil’s plans to disturb such a large area and base their mitigation strategy on 
uncertain reclamation strategies and approaches.” (p.2), “the high levels of uncertainty in 
their ability to successfully reclaim its in-pit tailings and create a viable, maintainance 
free and ecologically sustainable end pit lake.” (p.5), “[the current impossibility] to 
predict whether this approach to MFT12 management will prove adequate or successful, 
and whether it will have long term negative environmental implications” (p.5), “[the lack 
of assessment by Imperial Oil] regarding the risks of potentially mining in proximity to 
                                                 
12 Mature Fine Tailings 
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undiscovered buried channels” (p.5) and finally, their lack of a specific plan for 
greenhouse gases emissions.  
The discourse of OSEC regarding the EIA underlined the significant uncertainties 
regarding mitigation plans in various domains. Also, they supported the advancement of 
science and alternative technologies to provide an environmentally friendly development 
of oil sands. However, as long as the mitigation plans and appropriate technologies were 
not fully understood, OSEC endorsed a precautionary approach that condoned the arrest 
of further project approvals. This discourse reveals an approach that regards uncertainties 
as specified although they are not as specified as in the government’s or the industry’s 
discourses. They also left place for interpretation regarding unknown uncertainties with 
formulations like “[the current impossibility to predict] long term negative environmental 
implications”. What this also lets transpire from OSEC’s discourse is that they do not 
consider uncertainties as being as strongly temporary as Imperial’s view. According to 
OSEC’s discourse, uncertainties can also be seen as stable when considered in the 
contemporary context. Lastly, uncertainties are also unintended since they are the result 
of the intensive industry.   
To this statement of concerns, Imperial Oil emitted a response on August 6, 2006. 
While OSEC’s document took the form of a letter, Imperial’s document was a report 
systematically addressing the points raised by OSEC. In this document, Imperial quoted 
OSEC directly, therefore using the rhetorical strategy of echoic speech (Stocking and 
Holstein, 1993, p.193) contributing to the demonstration of controllability. By taking 
OSEC’s arguments point by point, they aimed at showing they did have all the answers. 
The way they addressed uncertainties also highlights the difference in discourses between 
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the industry and the environmentalists. Imperial had an extremely assertive tone about 
uncertainties such as, “ongoing research is demonstrating that reconstructed soils are 
returning to equivalent capability.” (p.4), “uncertainty analysis performed on the project’s 
proposed pit lakes demonstrated that the predictions are robust and that they will achieve 
acceptable water quality (see Volume 6, Section 5.9.5.2 and Appendix 5A)” (p.3) and 
“the recognition that adequate time is available to progressively apply successive 
learning’s from ongoing research and modelling and resolve uncertainties before and 
after the first pit lakes are completed” (p.4). These examples show the central role of 
science and expertise to Imperial’s approach, and thereby strengthen their view of 
specified, unintended and temporary uncertainties (Wehling, 2006). The same rhetorical 
tools as in their EIA, i.e. caveats and allies with addition to the echoic speech, also 
support their assertive tone. 
 
4.4.1.4 Official Submissions to the Panel 
OSEC 
Nonetheless, these answers did not satisfy OSEC’s concerns. On November 12, 
2006 they submitted through their lawyer a 900 page long document to the Panel Review 
in which they also undertook a firm tone requesting, “that the approval of the application 
for the Imperial Kearl project … be denied on the basis that it is not in the public 
interest.” (p.7). The core of the document is of 50 pages and contains a list of approval 
conditions to the project, a list of recommendations to the Panel and the bulk of the 
document is a discussion of presented results by Imperial Oil. The remaining pages are 
scientific reports from various consulting sources. 
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The approval conditions section had nothing to do with uncertainties but 
everything to do with certainties such as requiring Imperial “to develop and submit a 
conservation offset mitigation strategy for terrestrial disturbance” (p.8), to “demonstrate 
how biodiversity monitoring in accordance with the protocols of the Alberta Biodiversity 
Monitoring Program will be incorporated into the Project’s environmental monitoring 
systems” (p.9) and “to provide the evaluation of the significance of air quality in relation 
to the guidelines and standards accepted by the Province of Alberta that was called for in 
the Terms of Reference for the project” (p.9) The recommendations to the Panel can be 
summarized in three sections. First the need for transparency from all parties industry and 
government, second the integration and monitoring of the project in recognized 
frameworks and finally, the use of scientific techniques OSEC judged more appropriate 
for predictions. The aims of these recommendations are to provide a strict regulatory 
frame to the KOS project. Lastly, OSEC discussed misrepresentations of scientific 
information in the EIA for instance comparing greenhouse gases emissions intensity from 
the Kearl Project with projects that are not its equivalent (see Appendix C for excerpt). 
In this document, it is interesting to notice that OSEC started talking more directly 
about risks. OSEC stated, “in the absence of thresholds, a true assessment of the 
environmental impacts associated with proposed projects cannot occur, and proponents 
are left to assess the environmental risk associated with a project” (p.22) and “air quality 
guidelines and standards act as a means of evaluating risk to plants, animals, ecosystems, 
and humans” (p.33) thereby emphasizing the need of certainty before proceeding with a 
project that could turn out having significant risks. They therefore took another angle to 
their precautionary approach. In their initial letter, their differing view of uncertainties 
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justified precaution. In this document, OSEC barely mentioned uncertainties in its core 
document. However the appendices they joined to their document contain expert reports 
supporting their claims, uncertainties are presented and mentioned. OSEC therefore 
seems to make a transition from addressing uncertainties to addressing certainties and 
potential risks to emphasize the need for precaution in the KOS project as a reaction to 
Imperial assertive tone towards OSEC’s vision of uncertainties. OSEC therefore does not 
change its discourse about uncertainties itself, but endorses a discourse where the 
approval or denial of the KOS project depends on the proponent’s ability to specify their 
uncertainties and to prove how they can be overcome. In their effort to make themselves 
understood by the Panel, they also use echoic speech to discredit Imperial’s arguments. 
OSEC shows flexibility in its strategies in order to attain its goal, which is to have 
Imperial Oil be denied approval for the KOS project. 
The Government 
The DFO and EC also presented submissions to the review Panel respectively on 
June 1, 2006 and October 1, 2006. The DFO met with Imperial Oil to develop a No Net 
Loss plan (NNL), which Imperial Oil published. This plan involved the condition for 
Imperial Oil to create a 2:1 compensation ratio for fish loss created by the KOS project, 
which is also legally necessary for the approval of the project. The document itself did 
not directly address uncertainties but was rather concerned with the uncertainties in 
predicting effects and how they should be dealt with. In its series of recommendations, 
follow-up programs insure that predictions are met and mitigations are efficient.  
 Another document submitted by the government summarized the points of 
concern of EC, the DFO and Health Canada (HC). Although they clearly expressed their 
Robaey                                                                                                                  MA ESST 2008                                                                    




concern over specific issues, they also formulate what they expect from Imperial Oil and 
the Panel’s decision, “in closing, DFO, EC and HC welcome this opportunity to share our 
views with the Panel and so provide this information for its consideration in reaching a 
decision with respect to the Kearl Project” (p.150). As opposed to OSEC, they did not 
oppose or support the project. They only expressed their concerns and the measures they 
believed appropriate to remedy to those issues. The government’s vision of uncertainties 
is mainly visible through its approach to the management of potentially adverse 
environmental effects, which is mainly monitoring, further research and adaptive 
management. Uncertainties are therefore still seen as temporary, unintended and specified 
(Wehling, 2006) like it was suggested already in the TOR. 
 
 
4.4.1.5 Panel Report and the Decision 
No written answer was given to OSEC’s submission or any other submissions. 
During the public hearings OSEC presented on November 16, 2006 a PowerPoint 
document explicating Imperial’s water use and the resulting problems. After receiving 
submissions and viewing presentations from different groups like First Nations and other 
oil companies, the panel produced its own report on February 27, 2007. The Panel report 
provided a summary of all issues raised and each group’s viewpoint, followed by the 
Panel’s own opinions and recommendations. 
What appeared through the Panel report was that the only discourse about 
uncertainties left was about the management of environmental effects. “The Joint Panel 
has made the decision that the KOS Project is in the public interest, but it must be clearly 
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understood that the lack of certainty related to the management of cumulative impacts for 
key environmental parameters … on the region have weighed heavily in this process.” (p. 
4). Nonetheless, “the Joint Panel has concluded that the project is not likely to cause 
significant adverse environmental effects, provided that the proposed mitigation measures 
and the recommendations of the Joint Panel are implemented.” (p.5) These mitigation 
measures included for the larger part the ones suggested by the different governmental 
bodies, i.e. monitoring and adaptive management. For their success, the Panel 
recommended a stronger involvement from EC and AENV in the implementation of 
regulatory frameworks (p.5). An interesting aspect to the monitoring process, which 
appeared in the Panel report, was the notion of the control dilemma. For instance, the 
Panel insisted, “monitoring should be carried out to ensure that impacts on fish and fish 
habitat … [be] mitigated at the earliest stage possible to ensure that the cumulative 
impacts on the Muskeg River watershed are minimized.” (p.86) This means that if the 
monitoring is not done properly, the cumulative impacts could be difficult to mitigate. 
Although Imperial did not recognize the pitfalls of their approach, the Panel stressed the 
necessity of carrying out mitigation plans properly. Generally, adaptive management 
seemed to be the approach to deal with uncertainties, which satisfies the Joint Panel. This 
suggests that the Joint Panel has a similar view on uncertainties as the government and 
the industry. 
 After this favourable report for the KOS project, the government of Canada 
accepted the Panel’s conclusions and all regulatory duties of monitoring that they 
recommended on August 1, 2007. The DFO granted approval to the KOS project. 
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While environmentalists groups endorsed a precautionary approach, the industry 
and the government favor an adaptive management approach in dealing with 
environmental problems. In chapter 2, adaptive management was presented as a tool to 
overcome the paralyzing effects of the precautionary principle. In this case however, the 
conflicting visions of uncertainty influence how each group believes they should be dealt 
with and what is acceptable for the environment. In that sense, their differing visions lead 
to conflict. The industry mostly has economical development for goals but is also 
interested in environmentally sound development. The government has economical 
development in mind as well because it is positive for the economy but it also obviously 
has environmental health, as stated in the laws. Environmentalists also have 
environmental health in mind and are not opposed to economical developments as long as 
it does not damage environmental health. All parties then share, to different degrees, the 
same goals. It is then their conflicting views on uncertainties that have been left 
unresolved through the environmental assessment process that ultimately lead to a legal 
dispute. 
 
4.4.2 Differing Views of Uncertainties settled in Court 
4.4.2.1 The Coalition’s Affidavit 
Shortly after the publication of the Panel report on March 29, 2007, the Coalition 
(see section 4.3.3) filed a judiciary review against Imperial, the Panel and the 
Government for unlawful environmental assessment.  Simon Dyer of the Pembina 
Institute was the main actor in this trial along with Sean Nixon, the environmental lawyer 
from Ecojustice. He made his affidavit on January 11, 2008 talking about Imperial Oil’s 
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environmental management plans and referring the Panel’s recommendations as 
“phantom mitigation” (p.5). The Coalition accused the Panel of not addressing the issue 
of what would happen to significant adverse environmental effects in the case that the 
mitigation plans did not work. The uncertainty of mitigation plans was only addressed 
through adaptive management and monitoring, whereas the Coalition demanded 
"technically and economically feasible measures” (p.2) and expressed its concerns on the 
regulatory frameworks like CEMA that have consistently failed to set environmental 
thresholds and be on time for their commitments. To the Coalition, this demonstrated a 
lack of precaution in the management of the oil sands development. 
As the Coalition was going to court, a more assertive and even more aggressive 
tone was necessary. This is underlined by the use of ironic reversals using terms like 
“phantom mitigation”. By opposing the Panel’s approach to uncertainties, the Coalition 
reiterated its conflicting vision of uncertainties with the other groups, who so far have 
been on the same page. The Coalition’s views on uncertainties are the same as OSEC’s, 
putting forward a precautionary approach, i.e. uncertainties are not so specified, more 
likely stable than temporary and unintended. 
 
4.4.2.2 The Ruling 
The judicial review took place in Edmonton, during three days starting on January 
15, 2008. Justice Lamer-Tremblay was the federal judge appointed to this case and she 
decided the case on March 5, 2008 in Ottawa. As mentioned earlier, it was a partial 
victory for the Coalition since the Judge ruled that the rationale regarding the impact of 
greenhouse gases emissions was unsatisfactory and demanded that the Panel re-do it. 
There are two main parts to this document. First she explained her interpretation of the 
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CEAA and second she delivered her ruling analysing the plaints against the report, the 
EIA and the CEAA principles, as she understood them. The plaints presented in Simon 
Dyer’s affidavit were subdued into three main issues of contention: a) Cumulative Effects 
Management Association (CEMA), Watershed Management and Landscape 
Reclamation, b) Endangered Species and c) Greenhouse Gas Emissions.  
In the ruling, the environmental assessment process is described as a two-step 
decision-making process. The first one is an information-gathering step and the second 
one is a decision-making and follow-up step. She claimed that the basic concepts behind 
environmental assessment are the “early identification and evaluation of all potential 
environmental consequences of a proposed undertaking” and sustainable development 
(para.15). In paragraph 22, she underlined, with the help of jurisprudence, how 
environmental assessment “is not a wholly objective exercise but rather contains ‘a large 
measure of opinion and judgement.’” What the Judge also made apparent from this value-
laden aspect of environmental assessment is the control dilemma, insisting that 
assessment must take place “ ‘as early as is practicable in the planning stages … and 
before irrevocable decisions are made’” (para.23). However, she also insisted that 
“finality and certainty in environmental assessment can never be achieved.” (para.23). 
Nonetheless, an important aspect of environmental assessment was to provide 
“technically and economically feasible” mitigation measures (para.26) Further into her 
interpretation of the law, she described the two “guiding tenets to environmental 
assessment: the precautionary principle and adaptive management.” (para.33) Also, “as 
an early planning tool, environmental assessment is tasked with the management of 
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future risk, thus a review panel has a duty to gather the information required to fulfill this 
charge.” (para.33) 
In the evaluating the plaints, the Judge referred to the precautionary principle 
several times. For instance, the plaints regarding CEMA as being inadequate to carry out 
mitigation measures were rejected. The Judge interpreted the role of CEMA as a “vehicle 
for the development of environmental management frameworks” (para.44). Also, she 
invoked the precautionary principle with regards to the use of CEMA in the sense that it 
was backed up by AENV in the event that it was “unable to meet its timelines for 
management frameworks” (s.45). Here the precautionary principle is understood as a 
back-up plan. It is however odd that the precautionary principle be applied to a 
management framework, which is not considered as a mitigation measure.  
The precautionary approach was further used in another situation. The Coalition 
suggested tailings thickeners were not an economically and technologically feasible 
technology and Imperial therefore relied on unproven technologies for mitigation plans. 
However, Imperial defended that this was not their only technology available and that 
they were working on it. The Judge therefore ruled that not developing tailings thickeners 
would “stifle innovation in the field, which could potentially result in future benefits to 
the environment” (para.54). Ironically, in that case, we see a contradicting application of 
the precautionary principle. One the one hand the environmentalists referred to the 
principle in demanding full certainty on mitigation issues before approval is granted. On 
the other hand Imperial and the Judge referred to the precautionary principle in the sense 
that the lack of full certainty cannot be used as a reason against taking potentially 
beneficial mitigation measures. 
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The environmentalist groups also put adaptive management in question. Imperial 
claimed the use of adaptive management would help them reclaim lands whereas the 
environmentalists affirm that there was not enough that was known to begin applying 
adaptive management. However, the Judge ruled that there was enough knowledge about 
wetlands and stated that “while uncertainties with respect to reclamation of peat-
accumulating wetlands remained, they could be addressed through adaptive management 
given the existence of generally known replacement measures contained in Imperial Oil’s 
mine closure plan.” (para.62). Solely the Judge and her appreciation of the Panel report 
decided the question of how much knowledge is enough. This underlines the highly 
value-laden character of decision making under uncertainties. 
The argumentation of environmentalists groups on the precautionary principle and 
adaptive management were unsuccessful. The views of Imperial Oil corresponded more 
to the Judge’s vision and the Coalition therefore failed to convince her. However, the 
Coalition won on one point, which were greenhouse gas emissions. They accused the 
Panel of not providing a rationale for stating that GHG emissions would not have 
significant adverse environmental effects. The Judge referred to the Panel as a 
consortium of experts possessing enough information to provide a rationale for their 
decisions. She also referred to jurisprudence quoting, “Experts, in our society, are called 
that precisely because they can arrive at well-informed and rational conclusions. If that is 
so, they should be able to explain, to a fair-minded but less well-informed observer, the 
reasons for their conclusions. If they cannot, they are not very expert. If something is 
worth knowing and relying upon, it is worth telling. Expertise commands deference only 
when the expert is coherent. Expertise loses a right to deference when it is not 
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defensible.” (para.75). Given that the Panel had the means to give a rationale but did not, 
she was “of the view that the Panel erred in law by failing to provide reasoned basis for 
its conclusion as mandated by s. 34(c)(i) of the CEAA.” (para.79). The Panel was 
therefore ordered to review its rationale for this particular point.  
Although there is clearly a great amount of values in the judgment, the ruling was 
still strongly based on trust in science and scientific progress dismissing the views of the 
Coalition in favor of the views of Imperial and the government. It was really a question 
of differing views of uncertainties rather than an issue where facts were disputed. The 
Judge did not look into conflicting scientific information, neither in potentially inaccurate 
scientific information. The way this conflict was analyzed also did not reveal a case of 
vested interests. Rather, it was really a conflict due to value differences. The Coalition’s 
view was one against the industry and the government. The Coalition’s views however 
succeeded in the social construction of an environmental problem by putting it through a 
legal dispute (cf. Hannigan, 2006, p.73ff) and thereby bringing their vision to the 
forefront. 
 
4.4.2.3 Panel’s Addendum 
On May 6, 2008, the Panel published its addendum as required by the Court. 
Instead of the three members, only two participated since one of them, from the former 
EUB, had retired. In their addendum, the Panel first presented the issue like a 
misunderstanding of their initial report aiming “to better communicate its rationale for its 
conclusion regarding air emissions, including GHG”. Also, they set out to explain their 
rationale for not only GHG emissions but also other air emissions. For GHG emissions, 
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the Panel listed twelve actions taken by Imperial to mitigate their emissions and 
supported that they were sufficient although Imperial had not specifically outlined a 
management plan for GHG emissions. The Panel also considered that provincial and 
federal frameworks for managing GHG emissions should take care of regulating GHG 
emissions and that “adaptive management will be required by Imperial to meet the 
forthcoming GHG emissions intensity targets.” There again, the Panel stayed consistent 
to its approach before the judicial review. 
 
Epilogue 
The KOS project was finally granted approval by the DFO on June 5, 2008. 
In an interview with a representative for an environmental group, the interviewee 
said the Panel’s addendum was an “an insult” and that environmental groups would not 
pursue further action because they thought they could not win. It was apparent from the 
interview that the differing views of uncertainties create a true misunderstanding between 
the different groups and therefore make the negotiation processes extremely difficult 
because there seem to be no common grounds.   
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How do the different parties involved in the KOS case deal with uncertainties? 
Basically, there were two main visions of uncertainties. Although there were more than 
two actors groups involved, they all seemed to line up behind one or the other approach. 
The first approach, in terms of Wehling’s dimensions, was a specified, temporary and 
unintended vision of uncertainties, or in other words a classical approach to uncertainties. 
It relied strongly on expertise to solve problems in time and on adaptive management to 
implement more appropriate and even newer techniques for environmental impacts 
mitigation. The Government, the oil industry, and the independent actors, i.e. the Joint 
Panel and the Judge, seemed to find this approach satisfactory and actively undertake it 
throughout the KOS story. The second approach viewed uncertainties also as unintended 
but at the same time as not so specified and more stable positioning itself in an opposite 
way on the knowledge and temporality dimension.  This second approach strongly 
emphasized the unknown and thereby justified the use of a precautionary approach to 
uncertainties also backed up by considerable amounts of expertise. This is more 
consistent with Beck’s ideas of the Risk Society since side effects of industrial 
development are unintentional (unintended), unseen (not specified) and compulsive 
(neither stable nor temporary). The environmentalist groups undertook this discourse. 
Yet, both views appeared to consider not-well managed uncertainties as potential risks. 
In those two visions there were however misunderstandings. The precautionary 
approach is understood in two different and opposing fashions. On the one hand, it is 
seen as a precautionary tool for the environmentalist groups to halt potentially harmful 
and irreversible consequences and on the other hand, the Judge ruled that the use of 
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adaptive management and expertise is precautionary. The discrepancies concerning the 
precautionary principle underlined by Foster et al. (2000) are highly visible here. 
Although the principle is defined in Canadian laws, the KOS case shows that this 
definition still leaves room for interpretation. However, environmentalist groups did not 
succeed in putting their interpretation of the law forward.  
Ultimately, the differing views on uncertainty of all involved actors could be seen 
as strategic tools. Yet, they do not seem to be very influenced by each other in their 
views. Instead, as presented in the previous paragraphs, the views and strategies were and 
remain different. In addition, while the oil industry is strong in creating allies with other 
actor groups, the environmentalist groups seem to stand-alone. Regarding their internal 
consistence, all groups showed firm positions on how they viewed uncertainties and how 
they should be dealt with, each helped by amounts of expert-produced scientific 
evidence. This shows that knowledge is not the issue here but that values rather are. 
All in all, why and how does the legal negotiation process contributed to the 
social construction of an environmental problem? Bringing an oil sands project in front of 
a court of justice was a big step. Firstly, it brought national attention to the case that 
included high-profile actors, giving recognition to the oil sands exploitation and the 
related environmental consequences. Secondly, the Judge’s decision then became 
jurisprudence and leaves a precedent for further cases where approaches to environmental 
uncertainties would be debated. This therefore sets a reference for the use of the 
precautionary principle and adaptive management in Canada. Adaptive management is a 
North-American concept and it is well established in the environmental assessment and 
environmental management’s psyche. The precautionary principle/approach is a 
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European concept that encounters variability even in Europe. Its new addition to the 
Canadian legal and political spheres still needs experience and defining. The KOS case is 
therefore very important to that end and sets a trajectory on how to deal with 
environmental problems. The environmentalist groups seemed to refer to a precautionary 
approach rather than the precautionary principle, but the Judge answered them on the 
basis of a precautionary approach/principle. Perhaps actors should work on 
differentiating those two concepts in order to change the “path” that the KOS case has set 
for the precautionary approach/principle. 
At the beginning of this work, I postulated the following thesis: in the social 
construction of environmental uncertainties around the KOS controversy, the ways these 
were addressed differed between the parties involved. Moreover, each party referred to 
uncertainties ambiguously for its own purposes. This thesis is partly supported by the 
case study. In fact, each group did have different ways to address uncertainties for their 
own purposes, or rather values, however, they addressed them in an unambiguous way, 
sticking to their guns and allowing little place for negotiation. 
In the end, the case itself was not a trial were facts were disputed. There were no 
experts supporting contrary claims and this is even more supported by the observation 
that the intentionality dimension (Wehling, 2006) did not show any variations. The 
current case did not allow showing whether certain groups would have had interests in 
hiding facts. To the contrary, everybody seemed to openly agree on the facts base of 
issues like air quality, wetland reclamation, etc.  
However, the different groups did not agree on how to go about these potential 
problems. Therefore, it was essentially a controversy on what is acceptable or not and this 
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thereby shows that scientific facts alone are not enough to meet a decision and that values 
play an important role. Although the Judge recognizes the value-laden quality of 
environmental assessment, the value she seemed to favor was the trust that current 
expertise and science was sufficient and precautionary. This opposes a precautionary 
approach, which would rather wait for more appropriate information to make a decision, 
as defined by environmentalists groups. In the end, this important decision on how to 
evaluate the acceptable level of uncertainties was left for only one person to weigh.  
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Appendix A- Main documents for analysis from the CEAA Registry website 
 
Date Document Author(s) Recipient(s) 
November 7, 2003 Public Notice – Proposed 
Revised Terms of 
Reference 
Imperial Oil  DFO 
November 18, 2003 Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act: Federal 
Coordination Regulations 
Referral 
The Agency DFO 
December 22, 2003 Invitation to participate in a 
cooperative environmental 
assessment review of the 
project  
The Agency AENV 
December 22, 2003 Responsible authority 
determination 
The Agency Imperial Oil 
January 7, 2004 Federal environmental 
assessment and the 
Responsible Authority 
DFO Imperial Oil 
April 22, 2004 Final Terms of Reference  AENV Kearl Oil Sands 
development13 
July 1, 2005 Environmental Impact 
Assessment 
Imperial Oil  AENV 
October 31, 2005 Statement of Concerns OSEC AENV, EUB of 
Alberta 
November 23, 2005 Preliminary discussion with 
Imperial Oil 
Imperial Oil DFO 
June 1, 2006 Kearl Oil Sands Project - 
Mine Development - Draft 
No Net Loss Plan Report 
Imperial Oil DFO 
June 1, 2006 Supplemental Information 
Request no.2 
AENV Imperial Oil 
June 9, 2006 Additional Supplemental 
Information 





July 14, 2006 Notice of Referral to a 
Review Panel 
The Agency N/A 










                                                 
13 All the parties (industrial and governmental) involved in the initial parts of the environmental 
assessment. 
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Date Document Author(s) Recipient(s) 
August 6, 2006 SIR Round 3 - Health Team 
Clarification Questions on 
Additional Supplemental 
Information 
Imperial Oil Alberta 
Environment 
August 6, 2006 Responses to OSEC 
Statement of Concern 
Imperial Oil OSEC 
 August 10, 2006 News Release - Federal 
Government Awards 
Participant Funding 
The Agency N/A 











October 6, 2006 AHW Clarification 
Questions And Responses 
Imperial Oil Alberta Health 
and Wellness 
October 6, 2006 Letter confirming EIA 






October 6, 2006 Government of Alberta 
Submission 
Alberta Justice Alberta Energy 
and Utilities 
Board 






November 15, 2006 Imperial Oil Statement 
Clarification for AEUB 
(002-030) 
Imperial Oil N/A 






February 27, 2007 Joint Panel Report Joint Review 
Panel 
N/A 
August 1, 2007 Government of Canada's 
Response to the 
Environmental Assessment 
Report of the Joint Review 
Panel on the Kearl Oil 
Sands Project 
DFO N/A 
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Appendix B- List of interviews and exchanges 
 
Date Person contacted Form of the 
exchange 
Content of the 
exchange 
June 6, 2008 Federal 
representative for 
the KOS project 
environmental 
assessment 
1-hour phone call 






assessment in Canada. 
No information on 
KOS project available 
and decision-making 
under uncertainty. 
June 25, 2008 High representative 
for the Sierra Club 
of Canada 
1-hour face-to-face 
interview carried in 
English in Ottawa 
following initial 
email contact. 
General and specific 
information regarding 
the KOS case, 
environmental 
assessment in Canada 
and decision-making 
under uncertainty. 
July 10, 2008 Recognised 
investigative 
journalist and book 
author on the oil 
sands 
1-hour and a half 
face-to-face 
interview carried in 
English in Montreal 
following initial 
email contact. 
General and specific 
information regarding 
environmental 
problems created by 
the oil sands industry, 
general and specific 
information regarding 
industry-government 




Between May 30, 









regarding risk and 
uncertainty 
management. 
Between May 30 







and phone calls. 
 
Between May 30 




and phone calls. 
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Appendix C: Excerpt from OSEC’s official submission to the Joint Panel 
 
“Under the heading “Marginal GHG increments” the proponent identifies that at 
full operations the Kearl Project will contribute 0.51 % and 1.7% of the most 
recently reported national and provincial GHG emissions (2002 data). (Volume 5 – 
Page 2-166). Imperial indicates that the GHG intensity for the project will range 
from approximately 38 to 44 kg ECO2/bbl bitumen (Volume 5 – Page 2-167). 
Imperial then notes that this intensity “…is in the range of intensities specified 
in approvals for other developments in the oil sands region,” and presents 
Table 2-72 ((Volume 5 – Page 2-167). 
Unfortunately this comparison is not particularly relevant and does not provide a useful 
analysis of Imperial’s performance relative to its peers. Comparing the Kearl Project to in 
situ SAGD projects (Devon Jackfish and OPTI/Nexen Long Lake) is not a useful 
comparison given that these projects employ fundamentally different approaches to 
bitumen extraction. Similarly, Imperial fails to note that the apparently high GHG 
intensity provided for Canadian Natural’s Horizon Project arises from the fact that this 
project will include an upgrader that will process bitumen into synthetic crude oil. It is 
more meaningful to compare the Kearl Project’s GHG intensity with that of their oil 
sands mining peers. For example, Petro-Canada/UTS’s Amendment Application for the 
Fort Hills Project notes that its GHG intensity will be 32.85 kg/barrel (Application for 
Amendment 2002, pg. 6-6, March 2005). Therefore, when comparing the Kearl Project’s 
GHG intensity with that of the Shell Jackpine Mine – Phase 1 project or the 
PetroCanada/UTS Fort Hills Oil Sands Mine one finds that is considerably higher (atleast 
7 kg/barrel).” (p.13-14) 
